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FREEDOM AND PRISON: PUTTING STRUCTURALISM BACK INTO 
STRUCTURAL INEQUALITY 
 
Anders Walker* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Critics of structural racism frequently miss structuralism 
as a field of historical inquiry.  This essay reviews the 
rise of structuralism as a mode of historical analysis and 
applies it to the mass incarceration debate in the United 
States, arguing that it enriches the work of prevailing 
scholars in the field.     
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Structuralism has become a prominent frame for discussions of 
race and inequality in the United States, part of a larger trend that 
began in the wake of Barack Obama’s presidential victory in 2008. 
This victory was a moment that inspired some to herald a “post-
racial” America and others to insist that persistent disparities 
continued to plague the United States, particularly in the context of 
criminal justice.
1
  No one made this point more forcefully than legal 
scholar Michelle Alexander, who argued in 2010 that not only had 
America failed to move beyond race, but the United States had 
spawned a new mode of racial controla New Jim Crow, as she put 
itthat relied on prisons and police to put “blacks back in their 
place.”2  
Alexander drew from the language of structuralism to counter 
conservative claims about incarceration as a logical outgrowth of 
poor moral choices, noting that “racism manifests itself not only in 
individual attitudes and stereotypes, but also in the basic structure of 
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society.”3  To illustrate, she invoked the metaphor of a birdcage, 
positing that “any given wire of the cage may or may not be 
specifically developed for the purpose of trapping the bird,” yet when 
“arranged in a specific way, and connected to [other wires],” still 
“serve to enclose the bird and to ensure that it cannot escape.”4  Mass 
incarceration was precisely such an arrangement, she argued, 
featuring “a wide variety of laws, institutions, and practicesranging 
from racial profiling to biased sentencing policies, political 
disenfranchisement, and legalized employment discrimination [to] 
trap African Americans in a virtual (and literal) cage.”5  
Despite her intriguing allegory of a multi-intentioned cage, 
Alexander spent little time considering whether policies that lacked 
racial animus may have contributed to mass incarceration, preferring 
instead to focus on the survival of invidious intentboth explicit and 
implicitin the post-Jim Crow era.  As she described it, 
“conservative whites” retained a deep commitment to white 
supremacy, and simply shifted from overt to covert racism following 
the end of formal Jim Crow, developing “a race-neutral language” to 
maintain a “racial caste system.”6   
While many found Alexander’s argument compelling, the 
question of racial animus remained a prominent, if unexplained, 
aspect of her work.  If whites did in fact want to resubordinate 
African Americans post-Jim Crow, where did this desire come from?  
Was it learned?  Was it the product of a defect of the white mind?  Or 
was it the product of lived experience, i.e. observations of the natural 
world that were then interpreted in a way that reinforced racial 
stereotypes?  Alexander did not say for certain, preferring to focus on 
how invidious intent lurked behind ostensibly neutral policies.  
However, she did hint at a structural source, one that she located in 
“human nature.”7  “It’s not that white people are more unjust than 
others,” she observed, “[r]ather it seems that an aspect of human 
nature is the tendency to cling tightly to one’s advantage and 
privileges and to rationalize the suffering and exclusion of others.”8  
The question of human nature remains, at its core, a structural 
one: a case for locating the origins of human behavior, including 
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racist behavior, in the biological structures of the mind.
9
  However, 
Alexander’s jump to biological causes proved an odd turn in her 
otherwise detailed account of a birdcage of ostensibly race-neutral 
laws and policies, a story that would seem to lend itself to 
contingency and complexity.  Further, much of Alexander’s book 
dedicated itself to unveiling hidden racial animus, not explaining the 
origins of that animus.
10
 
Despite her invocation of structuralism, in other words, 
Alexander’s study of mass incarceration is in fact something quite 
different.  She tells us not where racial animus comes from, but how 
it masquerades itself, a process more akin to the post-structuralist 
practice of deconstruction, not the structuralist project of locating 
underlying causes of particular worldviews, or “mentalités.”11  To 
illustrate, this essay will provide a brief review of structuralism, 
locate Alexander’s argument in the field, and then demonstrate how 
critiques of her argument might point us to a more genuinely 
structuralistrather than post-structuralistaccount of mass 
incarceration in the United States.    
II. STRUCTURALISM 
 Notions of structuralism owe their origins to the building trades 
which, as early as the fifteenth century in Europe, invoked the term 
“structure” to refer to “the action of building,” or what we today 
would term “construction.”12  During the course of the seventeenth 
century, this terminology evolved in two directions, towards the 
“product of building,” as in a wooden or stone “structure,” but also 
the “manner of building,” meaning the way in which “constituent 
parts” of a building made up a “whole.”13  This latter iteration 
became popular in other fields, including biology and anatomy, in the 
seventeenth century, to explain the internal workings, or “internal 
structure[s]” of human parts, like for example, hands.14  That which 
was structural, in other words, explained the component parts 
necessary to make things workbone, muscle, ligaments, and so 
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onwhile that which was not structural could simply be written off 
as superfluous, or “decorative.”15 
By the turn of the twentieth century, structuralist ideas crept into 
fields as disparate as botany, geology, chemistry, and engineering – 
but remained largely a matter of the naturalnot humansciences.16  
Students of the human sciences tended to explain their subjects in 
terms of personal agency and historical contingency, not the 
predetermined results of “deep permanent structures” but the 
consequence of individual moral choice.
17
  
However, an early form of structuralism did find inroads in the 
study of one topic: race.  As early as the sixteenth century, for 
example, Europeans traveling to Africa reported on startling physical 
differences between themselves and Africans, most notably in terms 
of skin color.
18
  Such differences then became the basis for 
widespread, rambling theories of intelligence, culture, and identity, 
what historian Winthrop Jordan has termed “an irresistible 
playground for awakening scientific curiosity,” that later became 
linked to particular types of legal control, like slavery.
19
  For 
example, scientists at the turn of the nineteenth century began to 
argue that racial difference could be measured by examining physical 
attributes, including cranial structure.
20
  This idea, termed 
phrenology, became widely popular in the United States during the 
antebellum period, and was wheeled out by southerners interested in 
rationalizing human bondage.
21
  As early as 1837, for example, a 
physician named Charles Caldwell concluded that African skulls 
were shaped in such a way as to suggest that they were more 
“tamable” than whites, and therefore better suited to be slaves.22  
By the 1840s, such notions declined in prominence, only to be 
replaced by an updated variant known as craniometry, which surged 
in the 1880s and 1890s and held that detailed measurements of skull 
capacity could explain intellectual prowess, not just for individuals 
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but entire groups.
23
  Such ideas took hold in a rising discipline 
dedicated to the study of human civilization, anthropology, and 
contributed to a surge of scientific theories about race in the 1880s 
and 1890s that became central to the rise of Jim Crow in the 
American South.
24
 
Meanwhile, another branch of anthropology emerged that focused 
not on skull size, but the physical process of perception.  Claude 
Levi-Strauss argued that human beings shared a common mode of 
perception due to the structure of their minds, and that this structure 
then influenced cultural development, a view that came to be 
identified as “structuralist,” and that was inspired by earlier theories 
of human language.
25
   
French historian Fernand Braudel joined Levi-Strauss’s efforts to 
find structural causes of human behavior, looking beyond human 
perception to the natural environment, including geography and 
climate.
26
  Braudel maintained that human perception (and human 
action) depended heavily on the physical interaction of humans and 
their environments, particularly over long periods of time, or what he 
termed the “longue durée.”27  To explain why, Braudel penned a 
path-breaking history of the Mediterranean world, arguing that 
proximity to water, climate, and other physical factors explained the 
history of the region better than individual leaders, ideas, or events.
28
   
Rather than read history as a procession of great men doing great 
things, in other words, Braudel focused on the “interaction between 
natural and cultural milieus” that gave rise to such men, including the 
work of historically marginalized populations dependent on the land, 
like serfs and slaves, as well as the importance of collective thinking 
over individual ideas, or what Braudel called mentalités.
29
 
Braudel’s approach to history came to be associated with an 
entire school of thought focused on a particular journal, the Annales 
d’Histoire Economique et Sociale, or simply Annales, that focused on 
the lives of average people, not elites, and captured European 
                                                                                                                           
 
 23  See id. at 211–15.  
 24  See Gregory P. Downs, University Men, Social Science, and White Supremacy in North 
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 29  Id. at 418–19; Schottler, supra note 25, at 38–39. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3310483 
6 UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:267 
 
attention from the 1940s through the 1970s.
30
  Annales historians 
took Braudel’s basic methodology and applied it to a variety of 
contexts, often using it to downplay political, intellectual, and 
military history, arguing instead that the continuities in the daily lives 
of forgotten people were more significant to understanding the past 
than dramatic moments, heroic leaders, or “the instant drama and 
distortions of the ‘media event.’”31  
The Annales school’s resistance to grand narrative brought it into 
conflict with scholars from other fields, some of whom rejected 
structuralism outright, and others who posited a variety of “post-
structuralist” theories of history that included bits and pieces of the 
Annales approach.
32
  For example, French philosopher Louis 
Althusser applied structuralism to Marxist theory, using it to explain 
how capitalist systems relied on public and private platforms to 
influence popular culture, thereby winning the support of the working 
class.
33
  Structural Marxists joined Annales historians in downplaying 
personal agency and private moral choice, preferring instead to view 
human actionincluding popular thought and private dissent, such as 
crimeas a byproduct of the situations that individuals found 
themselves in.
34
  However, they did believe in the possibility of 
dramatic events, foremost among them revolution (against the 
capitalist order) that could be accelerated through Marxist teaching.
35
 
Others, like Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, borrowed from 
structuralism to challenge conventional notions of historical change 
generally, arguing instead for the “de-construction” of historical 
categories, a notion that questioned the permanence of deep-
Braudellian structures, and emphasized instead the hidden power 
relations beneath even the most objectively neutral categories.
36
  
Crime, madness, mythology, and language all struck Derrida and 
Foucault as malleable, politically fraught areas of inquiry that 
obscured deeper contests.
37
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By the 1980s, aspects of post-structuralist thinking began to 
capture the attention of legal scholars in the United States, prompting 
them to question the neutrality of legal rules, an inquiry that led to the 
rise of critical legal studies in the 1980s and critical race theory in the 
1990s.
38
  Critical race theory maintained that objectively neutral legal 
rules could be deconstructed to find hidden racial animus in a variety 
of legal fields, including criminal law, a project that Michelle 
Alexander undertook in her widely acclaimed book, The New Jim 
Crow, published in 2010.
39
  
As Alexander told it, the story of mass incarceration appeared on 
its face to be the byproduct of a racially-neutral campaign to control 
crime but was in fact a veiled effort to subordinate blacks.
40
  To 
demonstrate, she cited statistics suggesting that suburban whites used 
drugs more extensively than did urban blacks but were policedand 
punishedless.41  The rationale for this, she argued, was racial bias, 
particularly bias on the part of “white conservatives” who did not 
really care about preventing drug abuse, but were in fact more 
interested in rebuilding a system of racial control that might replace 
the one extant in the American South during the era of Jim Crow.
42
 
On its face, the argument had a heavy deconstructionist bent, 
exposing white animus in places that made no overt mention of race, 
a classic post-structuralist move.  To the extent the argument was 
structuralist, it relied heavily on the permanence of racial 
animusand by extension racialized thinking generallyas a feature 
of American society, a mentalité of sorts that was also part of its 
longue durée.  Alexander hinted that this may have stemmed from 
basic human nature, a biological proclivity by elites to rationalize 
their privilege; this, however, did not explain precisely why race was 
the chosen rubric for elite rule, nor why mass incarceration was 
greater in the United States than in other countries with similar 
racially-polarized demographics.
43
   
To answer that question, more would need to be known about the 
transmission of racist ideas, and also any factors that might make 
those ideas more persuasive than their alternative, non-racist variants.  
                                                                                                                           
 
 38  See generally Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984); Derrick A. Bell, 
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 39  See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 2. 
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Such questions lend themselves to a structuralist, rather than post-
structuralist, account, as the next section shall demonstrate.  
 
III. ANIMUS    
That racial animus explains mass incarceration is a reasonable 
claim, particularly if one takes into account the long history of racial 
thinking, and racial science, in America.  For example, one could 
locate the persistence of white animus not in human nature per se, but 
rather in scientific claims about black biological inferiority 
rootedironicallyin structuralist arguments about race and 
physical appearance that first emerged during the colonial period.
44
  
Though Alexander does not get into this story, she could have used it 
to support her structuralist argument about the birdcage of criminal 
justice, arguing, for example, that racialist thinking was a type of 
mentalité, i.e. not simply a single theory or idea, but a whole realm of 
thought that captured the nation both before and after the Civil 
Wareven into the post-Civil Rights Era.  To establish this point, 
Alexander could simply have canvassed the long history of racist 
science in the United States, beginning with phrenology and 
continuing on through the rise of anthropology, biology, genetics, and 
a variety of other disciplines that openly endorsed notions of black 
inferiority as late as the 1930s.
45
 
Only by the close of World War II did such science lose formal 
credibility, but even then many Americans continued to believe it 
precisely because it had become part of the mental furniture of the 
United States, a view expressed in myriad ways and on myriad 
platforms, not just in scientific journals, for example, but in public 
media and popular culture as well.
46
   Americans who graduated 
college in the 1930s, for example, may simply have adhered to the 
racist ideas that they had absorbed growing up, carrying them well 
into the 1960s and beyond.  The structuralist frame of a mentalité 
captures this problem, explaining how certain ideas might continue to 
survive even though they have been formally discredited as a matter 
of sciencebedeviling policy for decades to come.47  This would 
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 46  Id. at 197–204. 
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explain, for example, why elites might have worked to reinscribe 
racial hierarchy in neutral terms during the 1980s, as Alexander 
claims, a move that stemmed from a heartfeltif deludedbelief 
about human difference that stemmed from a much larger mentalité.
48
 
However, racial animus may not have been the only cause of 
mass incarceration.  In Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment 
in Black America, James Forman Jr. challenges Alexander’s singular 
focus on white animus, focusing instead on the rise of violent crime 
in America in the 1970s, and then on the African American 
response.
49
  Using Washington, D.C. as an example, Forman makes 
the startling claim that African American voters themselves lobbied 
for longer prison sentences and more police, along with conservative 
whites.
50
 Forman concedes Alexander’s point about white animus 
and drugs, in other words, but goesfurther, demonstrating that in 
Washington, D.C. the problem of black drug use may not have been 
as serious as white use in the suburbs, but differed in that it coincided 
with a proliferation of firearms, and that guns became the weapon of 
choice for drug distributors, who used extreme violence to eliminate 
competitors and terrorize the city.
51
  
Drug-related violence, maintains Forman, became so intolerable 
that African American majorities themselves voted for higher prison 
sentences and more police, effectively joining white conservatives in 
what Alexander has termed mass incarceration.
52
 Rather than a 
product of some outdated racialist mentalité, in other words, Forman 
suggests that the story in Washington was a tale of rational choices 
that had unanticipated effects.  
But this too may be a structuralist tale. Forman’s story presses us 
to look more closely, for example, at the structural causes of crime in 
the United States in the 1960s and 1970sa topic that Alexander 
ignores. Further, Forman’s nuanced description of debates within 
Washington, D.C.’s African American community suggests that both 
cultural and structural forces contributed to mass incarceration’s rise, 
perhaps even its inevitability.
53
   
                                                                                                                           
 
 48  ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 40. 
 49  See JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA 
9–14 (2017).  
 50  See id. at 43–46, 51, 60–61, 107–11, 115. 
 51  Id. at 17, 39, 51, 126, 136, 145. 
 52  Id. at 43–46, 60–61; See ALEXANDER, supra note 2. 
 53  See FORMAN, supra note 49, at 17–46. 
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According to criminologist Barry Latzer, for example, the “late-
1960s” witnessed the “biggest sustained escalation in criminal 
violence in the United States since the 1870s,” a development that 
affected African Americans “to a much greater degree” than whites.54 
From 1960 to 1970, argues Latzer, “urban homicide rates” doubled in 
the United States, part of a trend that could only be partially 
explained by increased birth rates following World War II’s “baby 
boom.”55 “[N]onwhite males were responsible for 77 percent” of the 
increase, argues Latzer, yet only “[t]wenty-seven percent of the 
nonwhite male homicide spike was attributable to a rise in the size of 
that population.”56 
That police focused more heavily on urban blacks than suburban 
whites, a core aspect of Alexander’s argument, did notin Latzer’s 
analysisexplain the spike in black violence, which was reflected 
not only in arrest records, written by police, but also victimization 
reports.
57
  According to the National Crime Victim Survey, for 
example, “67 percent of the robbery suspects” in the United States in 
1973 were African American, a number generated by victims, not 
police.
58
  According to police records, only 63% of all individuals 
arrested for robbery during that period were black, a slightly lower 
number than victims reported, suggesting that police were actually 
falling short in their apprehension of black offenders.
59
 
Not only did blacks disproportionately commit more crime than 
whites, argues Latzer, but African Americans were also much more 
likely to be the victims of crime than whites.  From 1965 to 1973, for 
example, “the average homicide mortality rates for nonwhite males 
were more than ten times those of whites.”60  Part of this was due to 
proximity.  “Having migrated to big cities with a high degree of 
residential segregation,” argued Latzer, “black people living in poor 
communities became easy targets for their more violent neighbors.”61 
Behind such numbers, argues Latzer, lurked three structural 
causes:  (1) a surge in birth rates following World War II, yielding a 
disproportionately large population of young men;  (2) a mass 
                                                                                                                           
 
 54  BARRY LATZER, THE RISE AND FALL OF VIOLENT CRIME IN AMERICA 114, 128 (2016).  
       55   See id. at 110-11, 114-15, 152-53, 245. 
 56  Id. at 131.  
 57  See id.  
 58  Id. at 132.  
 59  Id.  
 60  See id. 
 61  Id. at 128. 
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migration of southern blacks to the urban North, part of the “Great 
Migration”; and (3) an underdeveloped criminal justice system that 
actually emboldened crime by failing to maintain order.
62
  
Black crime rates did not stem from biological factors, Latzer is 
careful to note, but environmental ones.
63
  Among these were the 
proximity of rich and poor in big cities, where “potential victims” 
were plentiful, and the odds of detection slight, due in part to the 
“anonymity” of urban areas.64  Also important were economic issues, 
including a shrinking job market due to deindustrialization, a 
segregated housing market due to discriminatory real estate practices, 
and a flight of white tax dollars from urban cores, all factors that 
historian Tom Sugrue has coined “the urban crisis.”65  According to 
Sugrue, the conditions that led to the urban crisis in Washington, 
D.C.and other American cities in the 1970s and 1980sresulted 
from major demographic and economic shifts in the United States, 
including some of the very same phenomena that Latzer mentions.
66
  
For example, Sugrue joins Latzer in emphasizing the Great 
Migration, which intensified in the 1950s and 1960s due to the 
mechanization of agriculture, a Braudellian development that drove 
thousands of black sharecroppers from the rural South to the urban 
North.
67
  While some of these sharecroppers found adequate housing 
and jobs, many did nota problem compounded by the fact that the 
jobs the migrants had hoped to obtain, i.e. high paying positions on 
assembly lines, disappeared due to automation and outsourcing.
68
 
 Meanwhile, little money remained to fill in the gaps.  In fact, 
public resources evaporated as middle- and upper-middle-class 
whites abandoned urban cores for remote suburbs, taking their tax 
dollars with them.
69
  While the reasons for their departure were 
myriad, the consequences for urban blacks were dire.
70
  Those able to 
                                                                                                                           
 
 62  Id. at 152–53. 
 63  See, e.g., id. (Latzer cites the three principal reasons for the surge in violent crime to be: the 
“coming of age” of male baby boomers; an underdeveloped criminal justice system that resulted in 
increased crime; and the migration of African Americans from the South to the urban North. All of these 
factors are environmental, not biological.). 
 64  Id. at 77. 
 65  THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR 
DETROIT (2005).  
 66  See id. 
 67  Id. at 23. 
 68  Id. at 130–35. 
 69  Id. at xxii. 
 70  See id. 
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find work and housing found themselves pitted against those who did 
not, a problem exacerbated by isolation, exclusion, andaccording 
to both Latzer and Formancultural baggage from the South.71  
As Latzer tells it, southern migrants brought with them 
“distinctive norms that support[ed] and encourage[ed] violence,” 
including a culture of honor that descended from nineteenth century 
whites but was adopted by twentieth century blacks, to catastrophic 
effect.
72
  Suddenly trapped in crowded but crumbling urban cores, 
blacks came into more frequent conflict with one another as they 
struggled for resources, and turned to violence as a result.
73
  Drugs 
factored in here, providing some with an outlet for depression, and 
others an illicit means of earning a living, though not without risk.
74
  
Guns provided security, violence resolved disputes between rival 
dealers, and crime spiked.
75
  
 But most blacks did not commit crime.  As Forman explains it, 
most African Americans brought with them not a culture of criminal 
violence from the South, but criminal punishment.
76
  Black ministers, 
argues Forman, along with their congregations, viewed the rise in 
urban crime in Washington, D.C. and cities like it through a rural, 
Old Testament lens.
77
  As white liberals lobbied for treatment to 
lessen a heroin epidemic, for example, black ministers balked, opting 
instead for punishment.
78
  And, as white liberals lobbied for 
decriminalization of substances like marijuana, black ministers 
balked again, arguing for prohibition.
79
  Both stances were classic 
evangelical positions, positions that actually united Protestants, white 
and black, across the South and Midwest.
80
    
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As Forman suggests, the origins of mass incarceration in the 
United States lie not simply in reconfigurations of racial animus, as 
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Alexander maintains, but much deeper structures as well.
81
  Among 
them were technological shifts that brought black migrants out of the 
South and then left them struggling to find work in a postindustrial, 
urban landscape.
82
  Complicating this were depletions in urban 
services, wrought by departures of middle- and upper-middle-class 
urbanites, coupled with poorly-funded police forces, and an 
overwhelmed criminal justice system.
83
  
Such forces left African Americans trapped in urban cores with 
few options for dealing with unemployment, substandard housing, 
and poor education, all factors that contributed to spikes in crime.
84
   
Complicating this was heroin and other narcotics, which flooded 
urban streets in the 1970s and contributedalong with a profusion of 
firearmsto the creation of violent, illicit markets.85 Though such 
markets provided some with an alternate means of survival, they 
instilled in others a sense that more prisons and police were necessary 
to restore order.  
Missing were services, or what Forman calls a “Marshall Plan,” 
for urban America that African Americans hoped for but never 
received.
86
 Had such a plan been implemented, with jobs, housing, 
health care, education, and other forms of support, crime may never 
have reached the levels that it did, and calls for prisons and police 
may have subsided. However, voters turned the opposite way, 
moving away from Johnson-era calls for a Great Society and towards 
a more punitive model, a choice that Forman argues was not simply a 
plot to reinstate racial caste in the post-Jim Crow era, but a byproduct 
of a deep-seated belief in moral choice, personal responsibility, and 
punishment.
87
  
The extent to which popular support for punishment drew 
strength from latent racism is not clear.  Alexander argues that it was 
the single largest factor behind the punitive turn in American criminal 
justice, a point that could conceivably be explained by the holdover 
of a racialist mentalité in the United States following the Civil Rights 
Era, a mentalité reinforced, ironically, by spikes in black crime.  
Though Alexander does not mention it, for example, her theory of 
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animus could actually be strengthened if it were cast as a response, in 
part, to the crime wave of the 1960s and 1970s. Such a claim, were it 
true, would be a more accurate, structuralist account of why animus 
drove the war on drugs, an account free from speculative claims 
about human nature, but istill supportive of Alexander’s theory.  Put 
another way, conservative whites found their racialist theories 
confirmed once they read news accounts of black crime.   
Of course, such a conclusion would lend itself to a different set of 
policy implications than straightforward criminal justice reform.  
According to Forman, America’s affinity for incarceration stems 
from even deeper roots than its views on race, roots linked to biblical 
notions of punishment and personal moral responsibility.
88
 Such 
ideas are religious in origin, not racist, and tie in closely to core 
American ideals, including the idea of freedom of religion, freedom 
of expression, and liberty itself.   
In all fifty states, for example, criminal codes focus on personal 
moral choice as the basis for punishment, ignoring structural causes 
of crime.  An individual’s limited number of choices, limited number 
of opportunities, or limited education is irrelevant to whether or not 
they will be punished. Children of poor migrants, who leave one 
region for another, fail to find jobs, and end up trapped in isolated, 
crumbling urban cores, are treated no differently from children of 
privileged elites who are born into wealth and opportunity.   
Further, American law limits what the government can do for 
minorities, particularly racial minorities, in the interest of preserving 
liberty.  In a string of cases handed down during the era of mass 
incarceration, the United States Supreme Court put a series of 
roadblocks in the way of structural reform.  Among these were San 
Antonio v. Rodriguez, which upheld disparate funding of public 
schools;
89
 Milliken v. Bradley, which prevented multidistrict 
solutions to problems of segregation, white flight, and urban 
isolation;
90
 and Regents v. Bakke, which declared programs 
specifically aimed at addressing generalized past harm a violation of 
equal protection.
91
   All of these opinions drew inspiration from the 
Court’s stated commitment to limiting state power and preserving, to 
the greatest extent possible, personal libertyincluding the liberty to 
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move from place to place, whether from South to North or city to 
suburb, unregulated.  
Because most Americanswhite and blackbelieve in 
individual liberty and personal moral responsibility, we are poorly 
equipped to address problems that are structural in origin.  This 
includes problems of racial animus, which draw strength from deep 
seated mentalités but are hard to eradicateparticularly when the 
Constitution protects racist speechas well as deeper problems of 
demographics, economics, and limited government power.  To note 
this, however, is not to detract from Alexander’s story of mass 
incarceration, but to put it on a more structuralist footing.  
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